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GOVERNMENT OFFSETS TO CYCLICAL LOSSES
IN PERSONAL INCOME
THEseverityof the Great Depression and the slowness and partial
character of the recovery before World War II brought to the fore
governmental schemes designed to inject purchasing power into the
income stream at ebbs in the economic tides. At much the same
time there developed a literature on "built-in" stabilizers of income—
quasi-automatic programs—that come into play to bolster income
when it begins to sag and to restrain the rise in income when infla-
tionary pressures become serious. It is not our purpose to 'review or
appraise this literature.1 Our aim is an empirical one: to determine
whether the programs we can readily analyze are in fact counter-
cyclical and to measure their importance during the recent past in
supporting personal income once it. begins to fall. We have selected
three programs for discussion: the farm price-support program,
unemployment compensation and related programs, and the federal
personal income tax. Only the second and third lend themselves
readily to measurement.
Agricultural Programs
In recent years the federal government's program for maintaining
farm income has had two main facets: cash benefits and price
support.2
Cash benefits are paid directly to farm operators, primarily to
encourage conservation practices and to provide incentives for
production control through withdrawal of acreage from cultivation
for specified crops. Did these benefit payments follow a counter-
cyclical course with respect to net farm income after World War II?
If so, the year-to-year change in volume of cash disbursed should
be opposite in direction to the annual change in the net income of
farm operators. This is a minimum condition if the program is to
'For a discussion of these problems and a brief bibliography see A. C. Hart,
Money, Debt and Economic Activity (2nd ed., Frentice-Hall, 1953, Chapter 28).
2Bothprograms were initiated in 1933. During the 1930's the main objective
was to raise the income of farmers—countercycical only in a broad sense—and
during the war years it was to expand production. It seems appropriate, there-
fore, to look for countercyclical behavior only in the postwar years. However,
see pages 94-96 for a brief comment on the complications that arise from
countercycical measures when cycles in net farm income do not conform to
cycles in general business.
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qualify as countercydical. According to the data in Table 28, the
annual changes in net income and in cash benefits were opposite in
direction in only two out of the six year-to-year changes. Cash
TABLE 28












Source: Net income of farm proprietors: Survey of Current Business, Dept. of
Commerce, July 1952, Table 1, pp. 12-13. Government benefit payments re-
tained by farm operators: Farm Income Situation, Bureau of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, August-September 1952, Tables 9 and 13, pp. 35 and 39.
benefits failed to increase during the first year that net farm income
showed a decline (1949), and increased by only $88 million in the
second year (1950), when net income was reduced by $4,318 million
below the 1948 peak. Moreover, in 1951, when net farm income again
increased, cash benefits remained virtually unchanged. We conclude
that this program has not been an important offset to loss of farm
income in the postwar period. This was partly intentional, of course,
since some of the objectives of the program are long-run, not short-
run, in character.
In the price-support program, farmers receive cash directly from
nonrecourse loans made or guaranteed by the Commodity Credit
Corporation of the Department of Agriculture and from its direct
purchases of commodities. The CCC, however, on occasion disposes
of some or all of its holdings through the commercial market in
competition with farmers. The inventories of the CCC represent the
net purchases (purchases less sales) plus the collateral acquired
from farmers defaulting on loans. The federal government'scumu-
lated investment (actual and contingent)in the price-support
program on a given date is the sum of the loans held by the CCC,
loans held by private lending agencies with CCC guarantee, pur-
chase agreement obligations, and inventories of the CCC.
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This investment by the federal government is not a measure of
the financial benefit received by farmers (offset to loss of net income)
from the price-support program. A measure of this benefit woul.d be
the difference between (1) actual farm receipts from sales in com-
mercial markets plus sales to and net loans from the CCC and
(2) what farm receipts would have been from commercial sales
without a price-support program—assuming that farm production
expenses are the same with or without price supports. Since 2 is a
hypothetical quantity, it is bound to be characterized by large errors
of estimate, and for this reason no annual estimates of this offset to
loss of farm net income have been However, changes
in the government's investment in price-support operations are an
indicator of the direction of change in the amount of the offset
provided by this program to loss in net farm income. If the change
in the government's investment rises or falls, we may infer that the
amount of the offset does the same. By analyzing changes in the
government's investment, therefore, we can determine whether the
program has in fact been operating in a countercydical manner.
The offset provided by this program (Chart 21 and Table 29)
has shown a higher degree of countercycical conformity since the
war than the crop control program, but the conformity has been less
than perfect. If this device were a fully effective stabilizer of farm
income, the series on quarterly changes in the amount of the govern-
ment's outstanding investment would rise when farm income recedes
and decline when farm income expands. Assuming that the invest-
ment is to be liquidated. sometime in the course of the cycle, we
might expect that the changes in total outstanding investment would
pass from positive to negative values sometime in mid-expansion,
and from negative to positive values sometime in mid-contraction.
By this test, the program has shown only partial countercydical
conformity. The peak in quarterly changes in the government's in-
vestment (based on a four-quarter moving average to eliminate
seasonal fluctuations) occurred at the end of the fourth quarter of
1948, although the contraction of farm income continued until the
fourth quarter of 1949. Similarly, in the following expansion, the
trough in the decline of the government's investment was reached
at the end of the fourth quarter of 1950, although farm income con-
tinued to expand until the fourth quarter of 1951. Finally, the change
from negative to positive values occurred very shortly after the peak
8Innote 4, below, such an estimate for 1949 is presented for its illustrative
value.
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in farm income, and the converse change occurred after the trough
in farm income.
From the point of view of stabilization, one might say that the
program responded too promptly to cyclical developments, exerting
its maximum countercyclical effect in early expansion and early con-
traction, instead of toward the end of these phases. This tendency
is clearly revealed in the figures on the government's total outstand-
ing investment in the program, which reached its peak and troughs
almost synchronously with the trough and peaks of farm income,
rather than roughly half a phase later, as an ideal program might be
expected to do. Thus, in effect, the program failed to provide in-
creased support to the agricultural market during the worst stages
of the contraction, and operated to damp the ensuing revival at its
inception rather than when it was well under way. These observa-
lions, of course, apply only to a single contraction and revival, and
it is not therefore clear whether this limited success in stabilization
is an inherent feature of the mechanics and objectives of the pro-
gram, or merely reflects circumstances peculiar to the postwar
period. It must be repeated that since we do not measure the
absolute amount of the offset, we cannot say anything about its
relative importance in compensating farmers for the loss of
4As already noted, the amount of the offset is difficult to measure because of
the necessity of determining what prices and commercial sales would have been
without the price-support program. George Mehren has attempted such estimates
for 1949 ("Comparative Costs of Agricultural Price Support in 1949," Papers
and Proceedings, American Economic Reoiew, May 1951, pp. 717-746). Using
his estimates of prices and commercial sales with and without price-support
operations, we can prepare a rough estimate of the offset for 1949:(millions
of
a. Farm receipts with price-support operations dollars)
Actual commercial sales (from Méhren) 17,437
Sales to CCC (AgriculturalStatistics,1950, Dept. of
Agriculture, Table 756) 917
New loans minus repayments (ibid., Table 755) 1,850
Total 20,204
b. Farm receipts without price-support operations
Hypothetical commercial sales (from Mehren) 18,068
c. Offset to loss of net farm income (a —b) 4,138
d. Hypothetical loss in net farm income between 1948 and 1949
if there had been no price-support operations (change
in net income of farm operators between 1948 and 1949
[see Table 281 minus c) 9,028
e. Offset as per cent of loss in net farm income (c ÷ d) 46%
Because of the potentially large margins of error that must attach to estimates
of hypothetical prices and commercial sales without price supports, our com-
putation must be taken as having only illustrative value.
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CHART21
Form Proprietors' Net Income, Investment in Price-Support Operations,







Since the offset provided by the price-support operations is geared
to cycles in net income of farm operators, the program would not
be counterc yell cal with respect to personal income if the cycle in
net farm income did not conform with the cycle in personal income.
In recent decades there has been at least one instance, 1925 to 1926,
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TABLE 29
Farm Proprietors' Net Income, Investment in Price-Support Operations,
and Changes in Total Investment, 1946-1952
INVESTMENT IN PRICE-SUPPORT OPERATIONSb
Outstanding
Total Investment
FARM Loans and Change











19461st 13.3 562 150 712
2nd 13.5 398 48 446 —266
3rd 16.0 351 29 380 —68
4th 16.4 291 120 411 +31
19471st 16.0 256 200 456 +45
2nd 14.5 294 121 415
3rd 15.0 311 174 485 +70
4th 17.0 286 279 565 +80
19481st 16.7 209 281 490 —75
2nd 18.8 150 144 294 —196
3rd 18.0 202 573 775 +481
4th 17.2 322 1,841 2,163 +1,388
19491st 14.4 326 2,269 2,595 +432
2nd 12.8 1,082 1,610 2,692 +97
3rd 12.0 1,656 1,456 3,112 +420
4th 11.8 1,725 1,976 3,701 +589
19501st 12.4 1,855 2,372 4,227 +526















































H Seasonallyadjusted annual rates;
b End of quarter.
Source: Net income of farm proprietors: National Income Supplement, 1951,
Survey of Current Business, Dept. of Commerce, Table 41,p. 205, and Surve!,i
of Current Business, July 1952, Table 41,p. 29, and February 1953, p. S-i.
Inventories, and outstanding loans and purchase agreement obligations: Charts,
multilithed, Commodity Credit Corporation, December 1951, Table 7, for data
for 1946 to 1950; and monthly issues of Report of Financial Condition and
Operations, CCC, for data for 1951 and 1952.
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expanding. In such circumstances offsetting the loss in net farm
income adds to the inflationary pressures in the economy at large.
In the opposite situation—rising net farm income with declining
personal income—this program would add deflationary pressures to
an economy that was akeady contracting.
Unemployment Compensation and Related Payments
The offset to the loss of labor income provided by unemployment
benefits has been less than complete, in part by legislative design.
For administrative reasons and to prevent malingering, a waiting
period is imposed, weekly benefits are computed at about half of
the former weekly wage, and the number of benefit payments in a
fifty-two-week period islimited. Moreover, not all unemployed
persons are eligible to draw benefits, and it is not the intention of
the system to compensate for loss of labor income resulting from
the loss of overtime work, reduction in the normal or
cuts in wage rates. By measurement, however, we can determine
how much of the loss in labor income has been offset by unemploy-
ment benefits and related payments. Since it was not until 1939 that
all states were paying unemployment compensation benefits,° their
adequacy can be tested only by the two recessions in labor income
(wages and salaries) since 1938—those in 1945-1946 and 1948-1949—
neither of which was severe or prolonged. Initially we eliminate
from our analysis labor income originating in government, in order
to circumvent the special problem of loss of labor income resulting
from the demobilization of the armed
On this basis the first recession in labor income adjusted for
seasonal movements began in February 1945; labor income con-
tinued to decline until Octoberthat year, and by April 1946 had
more than recovered the level of the initial peak. In the second
recession the peak is September 1948, and the trough is October
In all states except Montana some partial unemployment is compensated.
The provisions usually stipulate that when partial unemployment reduces the
weekly wage of a worker below what his weekly benefit would be were he
fully unemployed, the difference plus an increment varying from $2 to $8,
depending on the state, will be paid as a benefit. See Significant Provl.sions of
State Unemployment Insurance Laws, October 1, 1951, multilithed, Dept. of
Labor, Bureau of Employment Security.
CSocialSecurity YearbOok, 1941, Federal Security Agency, 1942, Table 1,
p. 168.
The system of compensation to unemployed veterans following discharge
from service was an ad hoc arrangement that does not qualify as part of a
built-in system of income stability.
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1949; by May 1950 the level of the initial peak had been exceeded.
The loss in labor income in a given month (quarter) is the difference
between labor income in the peak month (quarter) and the given
month (quarter). We accumulate the loss between the initial peak
and trough and between the initial peak and the return to the level
of the initial peak. The relative loss in labor income is the cumula-
tive loss expressed as a percentage of the labor income that would
have been disbursed if labor income in the peak month (quarter)
had been maintained in all months (quarters) comprised in the
recession or recession and recovery.
The cumulative amounts paid out each month (quarter) as un-
employment benefits and general assistance minus the amounts paid
out in the month (quarter) of the payroll peak—all computations
based on seasonally adjusted data—constitnte the offset to loss of
labor income.8 The relative offset is the cumulative offset expressed
as a percentage of the cumulative loss in labor income.
In the first of these contractions of private wages and salaries,
compensation to the unemployed offset only 6 per cent of the payroll
loss; but in the second contraction, it offset as much as 17 per cent
(Chart 22 and Table 30). If we cover the period between the peak
and the return to the level of the initial peak, the relative offsets are
much higher, 12 per cent in the first. period and 20 per cent in
the second. In the 1945-1946 contraction and recovery, general
assistance accounted for about 2.5 per cent of the offset, and in the
1948-1950 period for about 8 per cent. This suggests that the longer
the recession and recovery period, the more important is general
assistance in offset payments.
For some purposes it is more appropriate to compare compensa-
tion to the unemployed with the loss in all payrolls (private and
government) or with the loss in disposable income (excluding
compensation to the unemployed). The offset to loss in total payrolls
has been computed for 1948-1950 on a monthly and quarterly basis,
and the offset to loss in disposable income on a quarterly basis
(Tables 31 and 32).
Unemployment benefits include those paid to railroad employees as well as
to all other covered workers. We include general assistance, despite the fact that
assistance payments are often received by unemployables, because unemployed
workers ineligible for unemployment benefits may also receive general assistance.
Moreover, assistance payments may be extended to supplement unemployment
benefits that are deemed too low to provide a family with minimum subsistence.
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of monthly data, the ratio
payrolls was 20 per cent (peak to trough) and 24.5 per cent (peak to
level of initial peak), as compared with 17 and 20 per cent respec-




tively in the case
payrolls
of offset to loss in total
of privatepayrolls.This is becausegovernment
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TA]3LE 30
Cumulative Loss in Private Payrolls and Cumulative Compensation to
Unemployed, from Seasonally Adjusted Monthly Data,
1945-1948 and 1948-1950
(dollars in millions)

















Loss in private payrolls $2,958 $5,750 $5,008 $7,450
Total compensation to unemployed $178 $698 $832 $1,504
Unemployment benefits 168 682 776 1,383
General assistance 5 16 56 121
Total compensation as percentage
of payroll ioss 5.8% 12.1% 16.6% 20.2%
TJnemployinent benefits 5.7 11.9 1.5.5 18.6
General assistance .2 .3 1.1 1.6
Source: Appendix C, section 1.
loss in total payrolls was smaller than in private payrolls, and the
given offset was relatively In this period the relative offset
based on quarterly data is slightly lower than the offset based on
monthly data.1° -
Thatthe cumulative payroll loss on a quarterly basis is generally
less than on a monthly basis is clear. Since the peak value is the
basis for computing the loss, the lower the peak value, the lower the
loss. The value of the peak month by definition is higher than the
monthly average for the quarter in which the peak month falls
The amount of the offset differs slightly in Tables 30 and 81 because the
1948 peak occurs a month later and the terminal date a month earlier in the
latter table.
10Usingquarterly data and dealing with the identical period, Ida Merriam
estimates the ratio of the offset of unemployment compensation (state and
railroad) to the loss in civilian wages and salaries as 24.3 per cent ("Social
Security Programs and Economic Stability," Policies to Combat Depression,
to be published by Princeton University Press for the National Bureau of
Economic Research, Table 2). This is identical with the relative offset presented
above in Table 31. Our computations, however, are based on total payrolls
including pay to the military, which continued to rise during this period (see
above, page 53), and on compensation to the unemployed that includes general
assistance. That is, if the only differences were those in definition of payrolls and
of compensation to the unemployed, the relativeoffset computed by Mrs.
Merriam would be lower than ours. The identity of the results indicates the
presence of other differences, which we presume to be differences in the seasonal
adjustment of payrolls and of compensation to the unemployed.
99GOVERNMENT OFFSETS
TABLE 31
Cumulative Loss in Total Payrolls and Cumulative Compensation to















Loss in total payrolls $4,275 $3,183 $5,992 $5,192
Compensation to unemployed $857
Compensation as percentage






Source: Appendix G, section 1
TABLE 82
Cumulative Loss in Disposable Income and Cumulative Compensation to
Unemployed, from Seasonally Adjusted Quarterly Data, 1948-1950
(dollars in millions)
Peak to






Loss in disposable incomea excluding
compensation to unemployed $6,453
.
$8,928
Compensation to unemployed. $749 $1,179




a Including realized net capital gains
Source: Appendix G, section 1.
(unless the three monthly values are identical, which rarely hap-
pens). Hence the loss computed from quarterly data will be smaller
than the loss computed from monthly data. By the same reasoning,
the payroll loss computed from annual data will be smaller than the
loss computed from quarterly data.
In the case of the offsets, the effect of the shift in the time unit
is not so clear. A priori, one would expect compensation to the
unemployed to be at a minimum in the peak payroll quarter and
hence the difference between the monthly average compensation in
the peak payroll quarter and compensation in the peak payroll month
probably to be negligible,. However, the 'monthly average for the
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quarter could be either larger or smaller than compensation in the
peak payroll month and the differences need not be small. In this
particular period (the fourth quarter of 1948 to the first quarter of
1950) the monthly average for the quarter of the payroll peak was
larger than the offset in the peak payroll month and by a significant
amount. This resulted in a smaller relative offset since the propor-
tionate reduction in the offset exceeded that in the cumulative
payroll loss.
Using annual data, we compute the loss in total payrolls between
1948 and 1949 at $982 million and the offset payments in 1949 at
$1,097 million. That is, the offset exceeded the loss by 12 per cent.
Thus the time unit is an important element in measuring the relative
offset.
Finally, we note that compensation to the unemployed offset 12
per cent of the loss in disposable income (excluding compensation
to the unemployed) that occurred during the contraction in dis-
posable income from the third quarter of 1948 to the third quarter
of 1949 (Table 32). If we cover the period from the initial peak until
the same level is regained (the third quarter of 1948 to the fourth
quarter of 1949), the offset amounts to 13 per cent of the loss in
disposable income.
Because the business contractions of 1944-1946 and 1948-1949
were mild, these measures of relative offset have limited value. It
would be more helpful to know the effectiveness of this type of
offset when the loss of labor income is substantial. Some light is
thrown on this question by data for certain states where, during
the 1948-1949 contraction, the loss in labor income was relatively
larger than in the country as a whole. The varying generosity of
benefit payments among state laws, however, somewhat blurs this
comparison.
For this analysis (Table 33), we have selected twelve of the
twenty-three states in which payrolls, based on annual estimates,
declined between 1948 and 1949, and prepared quarterly estimates
of payrolls (wages and salaries) in the private sector and of offsets
to loss in payrolls for 1948, 1949, and 1950.11 The amount of payroll
loss and of offsets during the recession and recovery were computed
as described above.
There is some evidence of an inverse relation between the relative
11Forsources of data and methods of estimation see Appendix G. For the
analysis of the state data we' are obliged to use data unadjusted for seasonal
variations since the data are insuffibient for reliable seasonal determination.
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TABLE 33
Loss in Private Payrolls, Compensation to Unemployed,
and General Assistance, from Seasonally Unadjusted Quarterly Data, 1948-1950,
and Change in Number Exhausting Benefits, 1948-1949,




LOSS GENERAL IN NUMBER
QUARTERS AS % OFCOMPENSATIONASSISTANCE EXHAUSTING
COVERED PEAK ASOF AS % OF BENEFIT
19481950PAYROLLSa LOSS COMPENSATION IUCHTS
South Carolina4th -.2nd 6.0 13.6 2.2 174
California 3rd —2nd 7.6 14.1 6.9 40













Pennsylvania 4th —3rd 10.4 10.9 11.5 134
Rhode Island 4th —3rd 10.5 15.8 18.3 122
Connecticut 4th —3rd 10.9 9.2 5.7 241
Alabama 4th —2nd 11.1 7.8 .9 106,
Ohio 4th —3rd 11.4 8.3 6.7 167
Illinois 4th —3rd 13.1 5.7 9.8 88
West Virginia 4th —4th 13.7 6.7 3.8 217
Twelve states 10.2 9.2 9.5
United States 3rd —2nd 4.3 20.3 9.7
a This measure of relative loss in payrolls is the actual loss as a percentage of what
would have been disbursed if payrolls in the peak quarter had been maintained in all
quarters covered in the table.
Source: Percentage increase in number exhausting benefit rights based on annual
data in Handbook of Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938-1951, processed,
Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security, revised November 1952, Table C-12.
For other data see Appendix G, section 2.
payroll loss and the relative offset from compensation to the unem-
ployed.12 The relationship is most apparent at the extremes of the
array. Thus the relative payroll loss is least in South Carolina and
California, and the third and second largest relative offsets occur
in these states. At the other extreme are Illinois and West Virginia,
with the two largest relative payroll losses and the two smallest
relative offsets. The least relationship is found in Rhode Island, with
the seventh largest payroll loss and the highest offset. This is ex-
plained in part by the relatively high share of general assistance in
total compensation of the unemployed. The right to general assist-
12 The coefficient of rank correlation for these two variables in the twelve
states is —.73.
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ance, unlike the right to unemployment benefits, is not limited to a
specified number of weeks in a given period.
The inverse relationship between relative payroll loss and offset
finds support in a comparison of the total loss and total offset of the
twelve states and of the United States. In the twelve states the
relative payroll loss is 10.2 per cent and the relative offset 9.2; the
comparable percentages for the United States are 4.3 and 20.3. The
relative payroll loss is less for the United States than for any of the
selected states because the United States total includes states with
payroll gains or negligible losses as well as the twelve selected states.
The explanation for the inverse relationship between relative
payroll loss and offset is to be found in the following considerations.
There appears to be a direct association between relative payroll
loss and the percentage rise in the number of unemployed exhaust-
ing benefit rights before re-employment. This relationship among the
twelve states is clouded by the inclusion of South Carolina and
Illinois (Table 33). If these two states are excluded as being
atypical, the coefficient of rank correlation is +.65. The continued
unemployment of those exhausting benefit rights either is uncom-
pensated or is compensated under a general assistance program at
a lower rate than that of unemployment benefits. Finally, the in-
ference seems warranted that because of the interdependence of the
various segments of the economy the relative increase in the number
laid off by employers not subject to unemployment compensation
laws varies directly with the relative payroll loss.
These considerations, together with our evidence, suggest that in
more severe business recessions the relative offset under present
laws would be decidedly less than it was in the 1948-1949 recession.
Federal Personal Income Tax
The third program, the federal personal income tax,is not
directed toward bolstering the income of any particular economic
group; in the past decade at least it has affected virtually the entire
population. The broadening of the tax base and the sharp elevation
of effective tax rates which accompanied World War H and its
aftermath have enhanced the power of the tax program to reduce
fluctuations in personal income after taxes, i.e. disposable income.
The proportional and progressive elements in the tax structure can
cause this effect without any change in tax rates and exemption
levels.
As long as the income tax is a percentage of personal income
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(i.e. proportional to income) and not an absolute amount, the
amount of taxes paid by individuals will decline in periods of con-
traction in personal incomes. If the tax structure is progressive as
well as proportional, the amount of personal taxes will decline
further because the average effective tax rate falls during business
contractions. During business expansions the tax program will pro-
duce contrary results.
This stabilizing effect might, of course, be negated if Congress
lowered tax rates during business expansions or raised them during
contractions. Congress in fact followed just such a course during
some of the expansion years of the 1920's and during the Great
Depression (Table 34). However, despite the rise in effective tax
rates during the Great Depression, the average effective rate de-
clined. On the other hand, a lowering of effective tax rates during
a business contraction, which occurred in the 1920-1921 and 1923-
1924 contractions, reinforces the stabilizing effect of a progressive
income tax.
We shall now measure, for periods of contraction since 1920, the
importance of (1) the total offset provided by the income tax system
in relation to the loss in disposable income (personal income after
taxes) and (2) the offset attributable to the progressive feature
alone. These measures are carried out for four contraction periods,
1920-1921, 1929-1933, 1937-1938, and 1948-1949. (In the business
contractions of 1923-1924, 1926-1927, and 1944-1946 there was no
decline in annual disposable income.) For the first three contractions
we are obliged to use annual data, but for the 1948-1949 contraction
we use seasonally adjusted quarterly data.
To measure the total offset in relative terms, we express the
cumulative decrease in personal income tax liabilities from the peak
to the trough year (or quarter) as a percentage (Table 35, column
6) of the cumulative loss in disposable income in the same period.
To estimate the loss in income for a given year (column 5), we
calculate what the disposable income would have been iftax
liabilities had remained at the peak figure (column 3), and then
subtract the given year from the peak year.13 In measuring the
relative offset attributable to the progressivity feature, we find the
average effective tax rate in the peak year (or quarter) and apply
this rate to personal income in the given year. This gives us what
tax liabilities would have been if the average tax rate had remained




Individual Income Tax Liabilities for Two Groups
of Taxpayers, 1913-1951
(dollars)
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX LIABILITY FOR
MARRIED PERSONS WITH TWO DEPENDENTS










































Source: Peaks and troughs are those in the National Bureau of Economic
Research business cycle chronology. Other data are from Annual Report of the
Secretary of the Treasury on theStateof the Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































at the peak level (column 8). Subtracting from this the actual tax
liabilities gives us the amount of offset due to progressivity (column
9), which is then expressed as a percentage (column 10) of the loss
in disposable income.
In the first three contractions the offset from the federal personal
income tax did not exceed 5.3 per cent of the loss in disposable
income (column 6)—a consequence of the narrow tax base and
low effective rates of that period. Because, of the broader tax base
and higher rates that have characterized the postwar period, the
relative offset was larger in the 1948-1949 contraction—13 per cent
of the loss in disposable income—but still of a minor order of
magnitude. The amount accounted for by the progressivity feature
varied from about two-fifths to two-thirds of the entire tax offset
(column 9 —-column4). The latter fraction was registered in the
1937-1938 contraction; in the 1948-1949 contraction, progressive
rates accounted for only 44 per cent of the tax offset," or in absolute
terms for $400 million.
This finding agrees with the inferences drawn by Melvin I. White
from his analysis of illustrative figures. He concludes that "The
automatic reduction in [tax] revenue that can be provided by a
progressive rate schedule would be insufficient to cope with the
deflationary pressures that accumulate in more than minor business
contractions."15
We can indicate also the combined offset to the loss in disposable
income during the 1948-1949 contraction provided by the
stabilizers—compensation to the unemployed and the tax program.
Here income loss is defined as what the loss would have been if there
had been no compensation to the unemployed and if income tax
14Differencesin the relative importance of progressivity in 1937-1938 (87 per
cent) and in. 1948-1949 (44 per cent) are due to several factors: relative severity
of the contractions, extent of shift in inequality of income during contractions,
and the relative •progressivity of the tax structures. The decline in personal
income in the 1937-1938 contraction (8.0 per cent) was more than three times
the decline in the 1948-1949 contraction (2.5 per cent). In the former contrac-
tion there was a shift toward greater equality, since the top 1 per cent received
13.27 per cent of total income in 1937 and 11.63 per cent in 1938 (Table 24).
We do not have comparable figures for 1948 and 1949, but there is reason to
doubt that a similar shift occurred, since salaries of corporate officers did not
decline and dividend and interest payments continued to rise during the contrac-
tion in those years. Moreover, for incomes above $5,000 the 1987-1938 schedule
of tax rates is more progressive than the 1948-1949 schedule (see R. A.
Musgrave and Tun Thin, "Income Tax Progression, 1929-48," Journal of Political
Economy, December 1948, Chart vx, p. 506).
15MelvinI. White, Personal Income Tax Reduction in a Business Contraction,
Columbia University Press, 1951, p. 16.
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liabilities had remained at peak Based on quarterly data, the
loss in disposable income during the 1948-1949 contraction would
have been $7,449 million (Tables 32 and 35), and the combined
offset was $1,649 million ($749 million from compensation to the
unemployed and $900 million from the tax program )—that is, 22.1
per cent of the loss in disposable income was compensated. This is
the direct offset; our calculation makes no allowance for the
"multiplier" effect of the offsets, nor do we stop to consider whether
the entire fiscal and monetary policy of the federal government on
balance added to or subtracted from these direct offsets.
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